When a user records a taught skill on one Team Computer bot, manual
takeover on another bot in the same space cleared the teaching lease
without stopping the session. Teaching input then failed silently and
skills/stop could not release the replacement takeover lease.
Reject computer/takeover while another bot on the same computer is
recording, matching the existing Stop teaching first messaging guard.
Co-authored-by: cynarAI <cynarAI@users.noreply.github.com>
Team mode stores one disk per Space. computer/readFile and computer/files
only verified the caller owns the entry bot; an explicit bots/<otherBotId>/…
path let one member read another member's workspace. Wire existing path guards
into the API router and executor file/shell tools, and add a shared-Space
authorization regression test.
Co-authored-by: cynarAI <cynarAI@users.noreply.github.com>
claimSteering matched steering rows by runId even after they were
claimed, and still returned them when updateMany updated zero rows.
That could inject duplicate user context into an active run.
Filter findMany to claimedAt: null and return nothing when the claim
update does not land.
Co-authored-by: Cursor Agent <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Co-authored-by: cynarAI <cynarAI@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(api): scope routine remove to acting user in shared Spaces
routines/remove only filtered by spaceId, so any member of a shared Space
could delete another member's routine by ID. Match update/testRun by also
requiring userId in the lookup.
Co-authored-by: cynarAI <cynarAI@users.noreply.github.com>
* test: drop unused ownerActor in routine remove authz case
Co-authored-by: cynarAI <cynarAI@users.noreply.github.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Cursor Agent <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Co-authored-by: cynarAI <cynarAI@users.noreply.github.com>
- Add teamBotWorkspaceDirectory import to router.ts
- Add exportOptions to scope team exports to one bot workspace
- Add authorization test: member export only sees their workspace files
- Add LocalAgentHomeStore and computerHomeKey imports to testkit
Non-owner shared-space members could read the space memory provider id
and internal endpoint origin via aiConsent/status, bypassing the owner-only
policy that draft PR #46 applies to memory/providerConfig.
Owners still see full provider disclosure; members get a generic Space
memory recipient when a provider is configured, without loading settings.
Co-authored-by: cynarAI <cynarAI@users.noreply.github.com>
- Replace findSpaceMemoryConfig inline call with getMemoryProviderConfig(deps, actor)
- Add owner gate: space members get 403, owners get config
- Add authorization tests for providerConfig/connectProvider/setDefaultScope/disconnectProvider
- Add wiring test to ensure router.ts uses the owner-gated handler
Team mode shares one disk per Space. export/bot walked the entire
team home, so a member exporting their own bot received every other
member's workspace files too.
Scope exportHome with the exporting bot's bots/<id>/ prefix and add
regression coverage for the shared-Space case.
Co-authored-by: cynarAI <cynarAI@users.noreply.github.com>
Non-owner Space members could read provider settings (mode, baseUrl,
endpoint metadata) while connect/disconnect/setDefaultScope already
required owner role. Align the read path with write authz.
Co-authored-by: cynarAI <cynarAI@users.noreply.github.com>
Team mode shares one disk per Space. RPC and executor paths under
bots/<otherBotId>/ were reachable with any member-owned entry bot,
leaking another member's workspace files while same-user cross-bot
access stays intentional.
Add path guards, filter bot listings, regression tests.
Co-authored-by: cynarAI <cynarAI@users.noreply.github.com>
